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FOREWORD: THE ROLE OF JUSTICE IN BUILDING PEACE 
Michael P. Scharf 
There have been some 250 international and internal armed conflicts 
across the globe in the last hundred years, resulting in an estimated 170 
million casualties, many of them civilians. In the aftermath of World War 
II, the international community pledged "never again," meaning never 
again would countries stand by while genocide, crimes against humanity, 
and war crimes were being committed with impunity, or at the very least, 
that the countries of the world would collectively ensure that the 
perpetrators of such atrocities are brought to justice. The Nuremberg and 
Tokyo Tribunals would serve as the model for such action and the 1948 
Genocide Convention and the 1949 Geneva Conventions would provide the 
legal framework for trying violators. 
Despite this pledge, justice was not employed as part of peace-building 
efforts during the forty years following Nuremberg, despite Nazi-like 
atrocities committed in places such as Bangladesh, Uganda, Cambodia, 
Guatemala, and Ethiopia. Then, in the decade of the 1990s, a new 
revolution in international justice began to take shape, beginning with 
efforts by national courts to assert universal jurisdiction over Chilean 
former dictator, Augusto Pinochet; then building steam with the 
establishment of the ad hoc international tribunals for the Former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and the creation of hybrid international criminal 
courts for Sierra Leone, East Timor, Kosovo, and Cambodia; and 
culminating in the establishment of the permanent International Criminal 
Court at The Hague. 
Still, many peace-builders perceive an inherent conflict between these 
evolving norms and institutions of justice and their primary objective of 
negotiating a settlement, in order to put a halt to violence. Reared in the 
school of realism, peace-builders are often perplexed by the mantra of 
human rights advocates claiming "there can be no peace without justice," 
when in fact history appears to be replete with many instances of peace 
based on injustice, as well as situations where pursuing justice has thwarted 
the quest for peace, and where justice has been successfully traded for 
peace. While they can no longer ignore international justice completely, 
peace-builders routinely endeavor to compromise its application and 
subvert its implementation where it is seen as hindering attainment of their 
primary objective. 
To explore this controversial issue, on February 28, 2003, the 
Frederick K. Cox International Law Center at Case School of Law 
inaugurated its war crimes research symposium series, with a conference 
t Professor of Law and Director of the Frederick K. Cox International Law Center, Case 
Western Reserve University School of Law. 
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entitled "The Role of Justice in Building Peace." The conference brought 
together former State Department officials, international prosecutors, 
military commanders, human rights experts, prominent journalists, and 
eminent scholars to examine the role of international justice "warts and all" 
in the peace building efforts of the last decade. 
The "Role of Justice in Building Peace" conference began with my 
introductory remarks, which sought to defme the concepts of "justice" and 
"anti-justice," identify the variety of functions performed by those norn1s 
during the peace-building process, and examine the perceived conflict 
between the approaches of accountability and accommodation which lies at 
the core of the common belief that it is sometimes necessary to swap justice 
for peace. This introductory analysis is captured in the first article of the 
Symposium Issue, entitled "The Functions of Justice and Anti-Justice in the 
Peace-Building Process."1 
Immediately following this introduction was a keynote address 
delivered by Professor M. Cherif Bassiouni of DePaul University College 
of Law, who had served as the Chairman of the U.N. Cmrunission to 
Investigate International Humanitarian Law Violations in the Former 
Yugoslavia and later as the Chainnan of the Drafting Committee of the 
Diplomatic Conference on the Establishment of an International Criminal 
Court. In his article, "Justice and Peace: The Importance of Choosing 
Accountability Over Realpolitick,"2 Professor Bassiouni traces the history 
of tension between realpolitik and accountability, focusing especially on the 
half-hearted response to German aggression following the first World War, 
the failme to respond to the Turkish genocide committed against the 
Armenian people, the prosecutions before the post-World War II 
Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals, and the efforts to bring those responsible 
for atrocities in the former Yugoslavia to justice in the 1990s. As Professor 
Bassiouni points out, these cases indicate an evolving international 
recognition of the central role that justice plays in establishing the 
foundations for genuine and long-lasting peace. And yet, Professor 
Bassiouni warns that the advocates of realpolitik will still seek to co-opt, 
subvert, and use justice as a fig leaf to achieve accommodation. The check 
against this, Bassiouni suggests, are the growing number of advocates for 
international justice across the globe, including many of the distinguished 
conference panelists, who will continue to keep the pressure on 
governments, who will make it difficult for governments to make the most 
egregious or outrageous deals, who will denounce governments when 
necessmy, and who will praise governments when they act honorably and in 
accordance with international humanist principles. 
1 Michael P. Scharf and Paul R. Williams, The Functions of Justice and Anti-Justice in the 
Peace-Building Process, 35 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 161 (2003). 
2 M. Cherif Bassiouni, Justice and Peace: The Importance of Choosing Accountability 
Over Rea/politick, 35 CASE W. REs. J. lNT'L L. 191 (2003). 
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Following the Keynote Address, the first panel consisted of a debate 
between Professor Madeline Morris of Duke University School of Law and 
Jerry Fowler, a Director at the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum about the 
usefulness of the "G-Word" (genocide) in diplomacy during times of 
humanitarian crisis. In her article, "Genocide Politics and Policy,"3 
Professor Morris argues that it is neither good law nor good policy to 
emphasize the distinction between genocide and crimes against humanity of 
other types, and that there are substantial costs entailed in maintaining the 
distinction. In particular, she laments the tendency of human rights 
advocates to employ the term genocide "promiscuously," that is to use the 
term in reference to an ever-broadening range of conduct that do not 
technically constitute genocide in order to claim the rhetorical advantages 
of the term as a call to action. In the long run, this practice will only 
waters down the moral and legal significance of the term. At the same 
time, Professor Morris points out that the contours of the legal definition of 
the crime of genocide, leave out other equally heinous offenses, for 
example those targeting political, economic, or social groups which are not 
covered by the 1948 Genocide Convention. In this regard, Professor Morris 
takes issue with the popular characterization of genocide as the "crime of 
crimes," pointing out that this "hierarchy of horror" approach tends to 
diminish the gravity of other crimes against humanity, which should be 
combated and prosecuted with equal fervor. 
In response, Jerry Fowler argues in "Diplomacy and 'the G-Word'"4 
that the term genocide continues to be useful at both the pre-justice and 
prosecution stage of responding to atrocities. But to avoid endless 
arguments about whether a situation qualifies as genocide -- debates that 
often result in a delayed response - Mr. Fowler proposes an innovative 
three-tiered warning system to characterize the state of ah·ocity: "genocide 
watch," "genocide warning," and "genocide emergency." Under this 
weather service-inspired approach, governments do not have to make a 
judgment that a situation constitutes genocide, but rather they can announce 
that the situation is in a range where indicators of genocide are present, 
which should be enough to justify action. 
The Conference's second panel, "Accommodation Versus 
Accountability in Peace Negotiations and Implementation," featured several 
distinguished panelists with real-world experience negotiating peace 
agreements. Reflecting the nuances of the panel discussion is American 
University School of Law Professor Paul Williams' article, "The Role of 
Justice in the Former Yugoslavia: Antidote or Placebo for Coercive 
Appeasement. "5 Drawing on his experience as Counsel to the Bosnian 
3 Madeline Morris, Genocide Politics and Policy, 35 CASE W. REs. J.lNT'L L. 205 (2003). 
4 Jerry Fowler, Diplomacy and "the G-Word", 35 CASE W. REs. J.lNT'LL. 213 (2003). 
5 Paul R. Williams & Patricia Taft, The Role of Justice in the Former Yugoslavia: 
Antidote or Placebo for Coercive Appeasement, 35 CASE W. REs. J.lNT'L L. 219 (2003). 
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Delegation to the Dayton peace negotiations, and the Kosovar Delegation to 
the Rambouillet!Paris peace talks, Professor Williams argues that 
employment of the norm and institutions of justice is necessary to limit the 
use and mitigate the consequences of the common peace-building approach, 
which he calls "coercive appeasement." According to Williams, coercive 
appeasement occurs when politically . and militarily powerful third-party 
states or peace builders, such as the United States or European Union, seek 
to resolve a conflict by accommodating the primary interests of a rogue 
regime despite the regime's use of force and commission of atrocities. 
Coercive appeasement frequently involves efforts by international peace 
builders to enable those responsible for the conflict to accomplish their 
objectives by coercing the victim of aggression into accepting agreements 
conducive to the interests of the aggressor. 
The third Conference panel was entitled "International Tribunals and 
Tribulations: A View from the Trenches." It featured three experts who 
worked intimately for the international prosecution of persons responsible 
for atrocities in Nazi Germany, the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Sierra 
Leone: Professor Henry King of Case Western Reserve University School 
of Law, who served as one of the prosecutors at the Nuremberg Tribunal; 
Lt. Col. Michael Newton, who served as Senior Adviser to the U.S. 
Ambassador at Large for War Crimes issues; and Bruce MacKay, 
Counselor to the Prosecutor of the Special Court for Sierra Leone. In 
"Personal Reflections on Nuremberg," Professor King shared his personal 
recollections on what it was really like working at history's first 
international war crimes tribunal, including several first ever published 
descriptions of the social distractions, the disputes among the prosecutors, 
the organizational deficits of the prosecution team leaders, and the 
opposition of the American Bar and media. Despite these obstacles, 
Professor King describes Nuremberg as a tremendous success, serving as 
the birthplace of the human rights movement, and the genesis of the 
concept of universal jurisdiction. 
Mr. Bruce MacKay was one of the first people hired by David Crane, 
the Prosecutor of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, and played a key role 
in building the institution from the ground up. In "The Special Court for 
Sierra Leone- The First Year,"7 Mr. MacKay offers a personal potpourri of 
observations on the difficulties he and his colleagues faced in Freetown, 
divided into three categories: people, places, and things. According to Mr. 
MacKay, the Special Court for Sierra Leone differs from other international 
tribunals in several respects, some of which created unprecedented 
6 Henry T. King, Jr. Personal Reflections on Nuremberg, 35 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 257 
(2003); see also Henry T. King, Jr., Robert H. Jackson and the Triumph of Justice at 
Nuremberg, 35 CASE W. REs. J. lNT'L L. 263 (2003). 
7 Bruce MacKay, The Special Court for Sierra Leone - The First Year, 35 CASE W. REs. 
J. lNT'L L. 273 (2003). 
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challenges: The Special Court, for example, includes a robust legal defense 
unit, supported by the Registry in the same manner as the prosecution staff. 
The Special Court had to operate at the same time as, and in coordination 
with, an international Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which was 
established to document the atrocities committed in SieiTa Leone. The 
Special Court was established by an Agreement between SieiTa Leone and 
the United Nations, rather than by a Security Council Resolution or a 
multilateral treaty like the Nuremberg Charter, raising a host of novel legal 
Issues. 
Lt. Col. Newton's article, "'A View from the Trenches': The Military 
Role in the Pursuit of Justice,"8 explores the concrete lessons learned and 
practicalities inherent "in actualizing justice within an operational 
environment." The article focuses on the controversy suiTounding the 
initial failure of the NATO troops to take action to apprehend indicted war 
criminals present in their area of operation in Bosnia. (To date, the NATO 
troops have not apprehended Radavan Karadzic, indicted for genocide, who 
remains present in Bosnia). Drawing from this experience, Col. Newton 
makes the case that "in the future, the military needs to ensure that the right 
mix of legal talent, translation skills, forensics expertise, and investigative 
capacity is front loaded as far as possible in the deployment cycle." 
The fourth panel, entitled "AITesting War Criminals: Mission Creep or 
Mission Impossible?" featured Major General (Ret.) William Nash, who 
had served as Commander of the NATO forces in Bosnia and as U.N. 
Regional Administrator for Kosovo; Ambassador David Scheffer, the 
fonner U.S. Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues; and Professor 
Mary Ellen O'Connell of Ohio State University Moritz College of Law. In9 
"AITesting War Criminals: Mission Creep or Mission Impossible?", 
Ambassador Scheffer traces the evolution in using international forces to 
aiTest war criminals from the failed efforts in Mogadishu, Somalia (the 
disaster popularly known as "Black Hawk Down") to the successes five 
years later in Bosnia, which were achieved only after a "battle within 
Washington" between those who argued that aiTesting war criminals was 
not part ofNATO's mandate in Bosnia and those who felt the aiTest of war 
criminals was essential to achieve NATO's mandate. Complimenting Col. 
Newton's article, which focused on the training, equipment, and specialized 
forces necessary to aiTest war criminals, Ambassador Scheffer's piece 
highlights the political will that must exist to achieve this objective, 
concluding that the aiTest of war criminals can occur only where the 
Commander-in-Chief and other top government officials place such action 
as the highest priority. 
8 Lt. Col. Michael A. Newton, "A View from the Trenches": The Military Role in the 
Pursuit of Justice, 35 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 287 (2003). 
9 David Scheffer, An·esting War Criminals: Mission Creep or Mission Impossible, 35 
CASE W. REs. 1. INT'L L. 319 (2003). 
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Employing the language of justice advocates, in the aftermath of the 
September 11th terrorist attacks, the Bush Administration pledged itself to 
either bring Osama Bin Laden and other leaders of the al Qaeda terrorist 
organization to justice or to bring justice to them. Following the use of an 
unmanned U.S. Predator drone, which fired a Hellfire missile against a 
vehicle in Yemen, killing a suspected terrorist and five other individuals, 
Bush Administration officials have said that the United States will target al 
Qaeda and other international terrorists around the world and those who 
support such terrorists without warning. In this context, Professor Mary 
Ellen O'Connell's article, "To Kill or Capture Suspects in the Global War 
on Terrorism,"10 examines when international law permits killing a suspect 
and when the law requires an attempt to capture or arrest. 
Scheduled to speak as one of the panelists of the final conference 
panel, "Building the Historic Record: Reporting on War Crimes and 
International Trials," was my good friend, Elizabeth Neuffer, Foreign 
Affairs Correspondent at The Boston Globe, and author of the critically 
acclaimed book, "The Key to My Neighbor's House: Seeking Justice in 
Bosnia and Rwanda." Unfortunately, Elizabeth was not able to make it to 
the conference as a few days earlier she was dispatched by the Boston 
Globe to cover the war in Iraq, where she was later killed in the line of 
duty. Our Symposium Issue is dedicated to this courageous journalist who 
did so much to publicize the importance of the role of justice in achieving 
peace. 
The journalist's panel is represented in this Symposium Issue by an 
article written by David Freudberg, 11 a documentary producer for Public 
Radio International, and host of PRI's "Humankind" series. In his article, 
Mr. Freudberg maintains that the press has an important role to play in the 
milieu of international justice, but laments the tendency among many 
journalists to play the role of stenographers to official power in times of 
armed conflict, a role which may facilitate the commission of war crimes. 
From Belgrade's statements about Bosnia to Washington's justifications for 
the invasion of Iraq, Mr. Freudberg maintains that the words and deeds of 
officials must be more sharply scrutinized, and more evenly balanced by 
coverage of unofficial sentiments expressed by those outside the halls of 
power who may be less beholden to the vested interests. 
The closing remarks were delivered by Professor Leila Nadya Sadat of 
Washington University School of Law, who is a Commissioner for the 
United States Commission for International Religious Freedom and one of 
the foremost experts on the International Criminal Court. Professor Sadat's 
imaginative contribution to this Symposium Issue patterns itself on the 
10 Mary Ellen O'Connell, To Kill or Capture Suspects in the Global War on Terrorism, 35 
CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 325 (2003). 
11 David Freudberg, Building the Historical Record: Reporting on War Crimes and 
International Trials, CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 333 (2003). 
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editorials published by Alexander Hamilton and James Madison in 1787 
under the pseudonym "Publius," advocating the ratification of the United 
States Constitution. In "The Least Dangerous Branch: Six Letters from 
Publius to Cato in Support of the International Criminal Court,"12 Professor 
Sadat makes a compelling case for U.S. ratification of the Rome Treaty 
establishing the International Criminal Court, employing the style and logic 
of the Federalist paper8. 
A few months after the "Role of Justice in Building Peace" 
Conference, Mr. Aryeh Neier came to Case Law School to deliver the 
annual Frederick K. Cox International Law Center Lecture. A holocaust 
survivor, Mr. Neier, has had a distinguished career, serving as Director of 
the American Civil Liberties Union, founder and Director of Human Rights 
Watch, and presently as President of the Open Society Institute, which is 
one of the foremost financial contributor of projects related to international 
justice. The author of several best selling books on accountability and 
human rights, Mr. Neier's piece13 is the capstone of our Symposium Issue, 
serving as a clarion call to the human rights movement to help make the 
new International Criminal Court effective and to assist national courts in 
bringing perpetrators of international crimes to justice. 
The "Role of Justice in Building Peace" conference was the first 
symposium organized by the Frederick K. Cox International Law Center's 
new War Crimes Research Office, established in 2002 with a grant from the 
Open Society Institute to serve as the focal point of several programs 
dealing with accountability for violations of international humanitarian law. 
Foremost among these is the International War Crimes Research Lab, a 
unique program in which Case Law students prepare research memoranda 
at the request of the international prosecutors on issues pending before the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone, and the new International Criminal Court. With the pennission of 
the international prosecutors, a year after the memos are submitted, they are 
posted for world wide viewing on the Cox Center's new War Crimes 
Research POiial: www.law.case.edu/war-crimes-research-p01ial. The Portal 
includes links to thousands of internet sites related to international 
humanitarian law and international criminal tribunals, and "instant 
analysis" articles written each month by prominent experts on salient issues 
in international criminal law. The War Crimes Research Office also serves 
as the research ann of the International Legal Assistance Consortium, a 
coalition of non-governmental organizations which, among other things, is 
helping to train the new Iraqi judges in International Humanitarian Law. 
12 Leila Nadya Sadat, The Least Dangerous Branch: Six Letters ji·01n Publius to Cato in 
Support of the International Criminal Court, 35 CASE W. REs. J. lNT'L L. 339 (2003). 
13 Aryeh Neier, Accountability for State Crimes: The Past Twenty Years and the Next 
Twenty Years, 35 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 351 (2003). 
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The Frederick K. Cox International Law Center and Case Western 
Reserve University School of Law are extremely grateful to our 
distinguished panelists for their participation in the "Role of Justice in 
Building Peace" Conference and contributing to this Symposium Issue of 
the Case Journal of International Law. Our appreciation also goes out to 
the student editors of this volume who worked diligently on the preparation 
of this publication. 
THE FUNCTIONS OF JUSTICE AND ANTI-JUSTICE IN THE PEACE-
BUILDING PROCESS 
Michael P. Scharf and Paul R. Williamstt 
If you want peace, work for justice. 
Pope Paul VI on January 1, 1972, 
in a homily on World Peace Day. 1 
To end the war is the primary responsibility of the peace 
negotiator. To assign responsibility and call for justice is 
the responsibility of the fact-finder--but she or he must not 
expect the peace negotiator to turn prosecutor. 
Anonymous UN official 2 
I. Introduction 
The norm of justice applied through the approach of accountability 
can be an extremely useful tool for the diplomat or peace-builder. 
Traditionally, peace-builders have relied upon the approach of either 
accommodation or the use of force in an effort to accomplish desired ends. 
In most cases, the tool of justice/accountability was neglected, or, if used, 
not employed in a constructive manner. Recently, however, there has been 
increasing use of the tool of justice/accountability in the peace-building 
process, including in South Africa, the former Yugoslavia, Sierra Leone, 
Rwanda, East Timor, Cambodia, and Iraq. 
Yet, the norm of justice, while increasingly invoked, is seldom defined 
in the context of peace-building. To understand the role that justice has 
t Professor of Law and Director of the Frederick K. Cox International Law Center at Case 
Western Reserve University School of Law;· formerly Attorney-Adviser for United Nations 
Affairs at the U.S. Department of State during the first Bush and Clinton Administrations. 
tt Rebecca Grazier Professor of Law and International Relations at American University; 
formerly Attorney-Adviser for European Affairs at the U.S. Department of State during the 
fust Bush and Clinton Administrations. Professor Williams served as legal counsel to the 
Bosnian delegation at the Dayton negotiations and the Kosovar delegation at the 
Rambouillet/Paris negotiations. 
1 Pope Paul XI, Homily on World Peace Day (Jan. 1, 1972). 
2 Anonymous, Human Rights in Peace Negotiations, 18 HUM. RTS. Q. 249,256 (1996). 
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played and has the potential of playing in the peace-building process, it is 
important first to defme the norm as well as articulate its functions. This 
article therefore serves as an introduction to The Case Western Reserve 
Journal of International Law's "Role of Justice in Building Peace" 
Symposium Issue by providing a detailed definitional description of the 
justice norm. In addition, it identifies the variety of functions performed by 
the norm of justice and the approach of accountability during the peace-
building process. This is followed by an examination of the perceived 
conflict between the approaches of accountability and accommodation, 
which lies at the core of the common belief that it is sometimes necessmy to 
swap justice for peace. 
In our examination of the functions of justice in the peace-building 
process, we use the former Yugoslavia as an illustrative case study. 
Reference to the Yugoslavia experience provides a particularly useful 
touchstone for this analysis because in no other peace-building process in 
history has there been so much political emphasis placed on the need to 
employ the norm of justice, and so much energy devoted to creating and 
utilizing justice-based institutions. The Yugoslav conflict is a particularly 
fertile research ground for accurately assessing the role of justice in peace-
building given the UN Security Council's creation of the United Nations 
War Crimes Commission for Yugoslavia and the subsequent creation of the 
Yugoslav War Crimes Tribunal; the utilization of the World Court by the 
government of Bosnia to allege genocide by the government of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia ("FRY"); the application of a plethora of minor 
institutions such as human rights rapporteurs, domestic truth commission 
and criminal prosecutions; and the extensive deployment of human rights 
monitors to prevent violations of international humanitarian law. 
II. Defining Justice and Anti-Justice in the Context of Peace-Building 
Justice being done, and being seen to be done, is the dijference 
between a lasting peace and an interval between hostilities. 
Ed Vulliamy, 
Correspondent for The Guardian3 
The word "norm" refers to collectively established guides for action; it 
originates from a Greek word referring to a carpenter's square. When the 
norm of justice is applied to the peace-building process, it operates as a 
carpenter's square in that it constrains the actions of state and sub-state 
parties to the dispute, including the actions of third party actors. The norm 
3 Ed Vulliamy, Bosnia: The Crime of Appeasement, 74 [NT'L AFFAIRS 73, 89 (1998) 
(quoting Justice Goldstone). 
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of justice also guides and in some cases dictates the actions to be taken by 
the parties, and may in some instances dictate specific terms to be included 
in a peace agreement or actions to be undertaken to aid the peace-building 
process. The sides of the carpenter's square of justice are comprised of 
truth, fairness, rectitude, and retribution/requital. 
As important as understanding the defmition of justice, it is essential to 
understand the nature of certain acts which undermine the effectiveness of 
the norm of justice, or acts which may be deemed to constitute the norm of 
"anti-justice." We use the term anti-justice, rather than the more narrow 
term injustice, to describe a peace-building approach characterized by 
intentional falsehoods and propaganda, perpetual impartiality and moral 
equivalence, the active erosion of the moral imperative to take action, and 
impunity and de facto or de jure immunity. 
A. The Essence of Justice 
In the context of peace-building, truth relates to an accurate 
understanding and recording of the causes of a conflict, as well as which 
parties are responsible for which actions, and which parties, including 
individuals, may be characterized as the victims or the aggressors 
(including the possibility that both parties are the aggressors). Truth also 
requires an understanding and articulation of the objectives of the various 
parties, including those of third parties, and an assessment of those interests 
in light of generally accepted rules of international behavior-in particular, 
those set forth in the UN Charter and other legal instruments.4 
An example of the use of truth to influence the peace process is the 
report of the War Crimes Commission created by the United Nations in 
1993 to assess the nature of the conflict in Yugoslavia and the extent to 
which the various parties were responsible for war crimes. This report, 
consisting of over 3,000 pages, paints a fairly accurate portrayal of the 
nature and extent of the crimes committed by all the parties, fmding that 
although representatives of each party had committed crimes, warranting 
the creation of an international tribunal, it was clear the Serbian forces were 
acting as aggressors and they had committed the vast majority of crimes.5 
This may be contrasted with what t~e authors were told were efforts of 
David Owen, the co-chair of the UN/EU peace process, to persuade the 
chairman of the War Crimes Commission to fmd that all three of the parties 
4 See Richard J. Goldstone, Justice as a Too/for Peace-Maldng: Truth Commissions and 
International Criminal Tribunals, 28 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 485, 486 (1996). 
5 Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to 
Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1994/674 
(1994). 
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had committed a roughly equal number of crimes and ail were therefore 
equally culpable. 
Fairness relates to an initial approach of impartiality-which can and 
must be adjusted in light of the truth about the conflict. Thus, while fairness 
requires that at the initiation of the conflict third parties approach peace-
building in an impartial manner, it also requires that once elements of truth 
are ascertained, they not be misrepresented in order to maintain artificial 
impartiality, but rather that they be incorporated into the decision-making 
process and policy be adjusted accordingly. An example of the use of 
fairness to guide the peace process is the State Department's attempts in the 
spring of 1999 to provide extensive detail to the public as to the nature of 
the crimes-being committed by the Serbian regime in Kosovo,6 even to the 
extent of naming names of suspected war criminals. 7 
Fairness also requires that third parties do not seek to apply undue 
pressure on the victims of a conflict in order to achieve an expedient 
political objective. This application is best exemplified by the U.S. efforts 
at the Rambouillet/Paris negotiations to openly acknowledge the victim 
status of the Kosovars. Thus, although the United States sought to persuade 
the Kosovar delegation to accept major concessions sought by the Serbian 
side, it did not initially seek to exploit their victim status. This can be 
contrasted with the approach of the United States four years earlier in the 
Dayton negotiations, where the United States threatened to close the talks 
and blame their failure on the Bosnian delegation if the Bosnians failed to 
agree to a number of concessions, which the Bosnians thought might 
undermine any serious effort to build peace-knowing that if the Bosnians 
were blamed for the failure of the negotiations, this would erode 
international support for protecting them from the continued campaign of 
genocide. 
Rectitude encompasses a sense of moral virtue, integrity, and 
righteousness, requiring the parties to "do the right thing" based in part on 
6 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, ERASING HISTORY: ETHNIC CLEANSING IN KOSOVO (1999), 
available at http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/rpt _9905 _ethnic_ ksvo _ toc.html; James 
Rubin, U.S. Dep't of State, Press Briefing on Massacre of Kosovar Albanians (May 19, 
1999), available at http://www.fas.org/man/dod-l 0 llops/docs99/990519 _rubin_ massacre_ htm 
(last visited Oct. 12, 2003); Amb. David Scheffer, U.S. Dep't of State, On-the Record 
Briefing on Atrocities in Kosovo (Apr. 9, 1999), available at 
http://www.state.gov/www/policy _remarks/1999/990409 _ scheffer _ kosovo.htm1 (last visited 
Oct. 12, 2003); U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, THE ETHNIC CLEANSING OF Kosovo: FACT SHEET 
BASED ON INFORMATION FROM U.S. GOVERNMENT SOURCES (May 14, 1999), at 
http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/rpt_990514_ ksvo _ ethnic.html. 
7 JAMES P. RUBIN, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, RESPONS!BrLITY OF INDIV1DUAL YUGOSLAV ARMY 
AND MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS COMMANDERS FOR CRIMES COMMITTED BY FORCES 
UNDER THEIR CoMMAND IN Kosovo (Apr. 7, 1999), available at 
http://secretary .state.gov/wwwlbriefmgs/statements/1999/ps990407 .html (last visited Oct. 
11, 2003). 
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their assessment of the truth and the application of fairness, but also 
including the legitimate interests of the third-party states and institutions-
the legitimacy of which is defined by principles of international law and 
generally accepted norms of state behavior. Although rectitude may seem 
subjective, in matters of armed conflict involving ethnic aggression and 
crimes against humanity it is usually possible to draw certain bmmdaries 
around the behavior of state and sub-state actors. 
A peace process influenced by rectitude, for example, would likely 
find the peace-builders reluctant to substantially accommodate or appease 
those responsible for orchestrating crimes against humanity as this 
legitimizes those actors and their methods, while also providing an 
opportunity for them to ratify at the negotiating table the fruits of their 
crimes. Moreover, the likelihood of building a meaningful peace on the 
promises and commitments of individuals and institutions responsible for 
crimes against humanity is greatly diminished, as evidenced by the 
multitude of failed cease-fires negotiated by various UNPROFOR generals 
with Serbian leaders Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic, who were 
indicted by the Yugoslav Tribunal for genocide. 8 
The guide of rectitude may also lead third parties to adopt appropriate 
policy responses to the conflict. For instance, in the Bosnian conflict and 
the early stages of the Kosovo conflict, the United States and its allies 
sought a negotiated settlement with those directly responsible for 
orchestrating the ethnic aggression. Failing to heed the guide of rectitude 
resulted in five atrocity-filled years of conflict, and a peace settlement in 
Bosnia many critics believe ratifies the gains of ethnic cleansing, 
widespread war crimes, and crimes against humanity. In contrast, when, in 
the case of Kosovo, the United States and its allies ascertained negotiations 
with the perpetrators would no longer suffice as a viable policy, they 
embarked on the use of force to defeat the Serbian military forces operating 
in Kosovo. As a result, the gains of ethnic cleansing were reversed, and 
there appears to be a greater likelihood for a meaningful peace in Kosovo. 
Retribution/requital comprises notions of compensation for victims, 
punishment of aggressors, recompense for physical damage, de-
legitimization of responsible institutions, and re-imposition of the rule of 
law. It does not encompass notions of revenge, retaliation, or reprisals. 
Institutions frequently associated with this norm include war crimes 
tribunals and truth commissions. Retribution/requital is particularly 
important in peace-building as, according to one notable commentator, "[i]n 
the fragile political climate that exists following a settlement, the 
temptation for retribution and revenge are considerable."9 
8 Prosecutor v. Karadzic and Mladic, Indictment, l.C.T.Y., No. IT-95-5 ~ 17 (1995), 
available at http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/englishlkar_ii950724e.htm (last visited Sept. 
19, 2003). 
9 Fen Osler Hampson, Can Peacebuilding Work?, 30 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 701, 714 (1997). 
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Retribution/requital and associated institutions "bring an element of 
impartiality that is necessary to restore faith in the judicial process and in 
the rule of law," something the parties and their domestic institutions are 
unlikely to accomplish on their own. 10 
An example of the influence of retribution/requital on the peace 
process is the establishment of the Yugoslav Tribunal to try· those 
responsible for war crimes within the territory of the former Yugoslavia. 
Other examples include the case against the FRY brought in the World 
Court by Bosnia and a similar case pending by Croatia, the Dayton 
Accords' creation of a property restitution commission, and discussions 
about a possible Bosnian Truth Commission. 
B. The Essence of Anti-Justice 
The antithesis of truth is falsehood, often spread by propaganda. For 
example, as detailed in U.S. Department of State cables, and a number of 
more recent publications, Slobodan Milosevic relied upon a highly capable 
propaganda machine to at first stir the nationalist feelings of the Serbian 
population into support for his objective of an ethnically pure greater Serbia 
and then to promote recruitment into the paramilitary forces responsible for 
many of the brutal acts of ethnic cleansing. 11 As noted by U.S. Ambassador 
Warren Zimmermann, through a barrage of propaganda via the state-owned 
media, 12 Milosevic played on Serb fears and feelings of victimization, going 
back to their defeat by the Ottomans at Kosovo in 1389, and emphasizing their 
treatment at the hands of the Ustasha during World War II. "The virus of 
television," Ambassador Zimmermann recounts, "spread ethnic hatred like an 
epidemic."13 
Slobodan Milosevic then turned his propaganda enterprise toward the 
international community and successfully imbued Western foreign 
policymakers with falsehoods such as the war was caused by the bubbling 
over of "ancient ethnic hatreds," all the parties were in effect "warring 
1o Id. 
11 For a concise summary of the Milosevic propaganda campaign, see Georgie Anne 
Geyer, How the Conscience of the West Was Lost, in THE CONCEIT OF INNOCENCE: LOSING 
THE CONSCIENCE OF THE WEST IN THEW AR AGAINST BOSNIA 74, 91-95 (Stjepan G. Mestovic 
ed., 1997). 
12 For a review of the use of media by all three parties, see MARK THOMPSON, FORGING 
WAR: THE MEDIA IN SERBIA, CROATIA AND BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA (Ann Naughton ed., 
1994). 
13 Warren Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe: Yugoslavia and Its Destroyers-
America's Last Ambassador Tells What Happened and Why 121 (1996). According to 
Ambassador Zimmermann, "Those who argue that 'ancient Balkan hostilities' account for 
the violence that overtook and destroyed Yugoslavia ignore the power of television in the 
service of officially provoked racism." Id. at 120. 
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factions" equally responsible for the commission of atrocities, the conflict 
was a "civil war" not involving Serbia, and the Bosnian government was 
prone to killing its own civilians in order to garner international sympathy 
and intervention.14 The adoption of these falsehoods greatly undercut the 
influence of the norm ofjustice. 15 
While the U.S. embassy in Belgrade accurately reported on the efforts 
of the Serbian regime to use propaganda to influence the international 
community,16 a number of foreign policymakers succumbed to these 
efforts. 17 In particular, David Owen readily adopted the notion of warring 
factions equally responsible for atrocities as it promoted his objective of a 
negotiated settlement of the conflict without the complicated involvement 
of the norm of justice. Similarly, Secretary of State Warren Christopher 
adopted Milosevic's notion of ancient ethnic hatreds along with the notion 
of warring factions, 18 to create the impression that the conflict was 
14 For a comprehensive refutation of the myth of the bubbling over of "ancient etlmic 
hatreds," see ROBERT J. DONlA & JOHN V.A. FINE, JR., BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA: A TRADITION 
BETRAYED (1994). For a more concise refutation, see GEYER, supra note 11, at 91-95. 
15 For example, according to Carol Hodge, Robert Wareing, a member of tl1e House of 
Commons Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, publicly informed the House of Commons 
that the 1992 bread line massacre in Sarajevo, which killed twenty Muslim civilians, was 
carried out by Muslims to gain sympathy from the world community and increase antipathy 
toward Serbia. CAROL HODGE, THE SERB LOBBY IN THE UN1TED KlNGDOM 13 (Henry M. 
Jackson School oflnt'l Stud., The Donald W. Treadgold Papers No. 22, 1999). 
16 For examples of the U.S. State Department reporting on Serbian propaganda, see 
Telegram from American Embassy in Belgrade to Secretary of State (Feb. 15, 1994) 
(Document Number 94BELGRA01209); see also Telegram from American Embassy in 
Belgrade to Secretary of State (Feb. 15, 1994) (Doc. No. 94BELGRA01232), available at 
http://www.foia.state.gov/documents/foiadocs/554a.pdf (last visited Sept. 19, 2003); see also 
Telegram from American Embassy in Belgrade to Secretary of State (Oct. 1994) (Doc. No. 
94BELGRA05955), available at http://www.foia.state.gov/documents/foiadocs/5524.pdf 
(last visited Sept. 19, 2003). 
17 For a dense, but useful, assessment of the extent to which Serbian misrepresentations 
found their way into the political decision-making process, see DAVID CAMPBELL, NATIONAL 
DECONSTRUCTION: VIOLENCE, IDENTITY AND JUSTICE IN BOSNIA (1998). See lillLL ARILD 
NILSEN, EUROPAS SVIK: ET OPPGJ0R MED VESTL!G UNNFALLENHET I BOSNIA (1996); see also 
PAOLO RUMIZ, MASCHERE PER UN MASSACRO 166 (1996). A typical example of the 
absorption of Serbian propaganda by government officials is former U.S. Secretary of State 
Lawrence Eagleburger's statement in July 1995 just after the Srebrenica massacre that, "fuey 
have been killing each other wifu a certain amount of glee in that part of the world for some 
time now." Interview by Charlie Rose with Lawrence Eagleburger, U.S. Secretary of State, 
Charlie Rose Transcript #1420 (July 13, 1995), cited in MICHAEL A. SELLS, THE BRIDGE 
BETRAYED: RELIGION AND GENOCIDE IN BOSNlA 124 (1996). 
18 See, e.g., U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Special State Department 
Briefing on fue Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia (Feb. 10, 1993), in FED. NEWS SERVICE, 
Feb. 10, 1993 ("These circumstances in the former Yugoslavia have deep roots. The death of 
[Yugoslav] President Tito and the end of communist domination of the former Yugoslavia 
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inevitable and the American government could therefore not be faulted for 
failing to prevent the conflict or the continuing atrocities. 19 And the 
propensity for UNPROFOR commander General Janvier to "believe Serb 
propaganda," according to his aides, was in part responsible for his 
rejection of close air support to defend the UN declared safe area of 
Srebrenica, which could prevented the subsequent massacre of 7,000 
civilians. 20 
Not all those involved in seeking a resolution of the conflict fell victim 
to Milosevic's propaganda ploys, as illustrated by General Wesley Clark's 
assessment that "[a]bove all, I recognized that fundamentally, quarrels in 
the region were not really about age old religious differences but rather the 
raised the lid on the cauldron of ancient ethnic hatreds. This is a land where at least three 
religions, at least a half a dozen ethnic groups have vied across the centuries. It is the 
birthplace of World War I. It has long been the cradle of European conflict. And so it is 
today."). See also Interview by Roger Mudd with Warren Christopher, Secretary of State, 
"MacNeil/Lehrer Newshour" (Aug. ll, 1993) (Warren Christopher declared, "In Bosnia, 
there are such ancient hatreds that evidently the ethnic groups want to try to divide it and be 
in separate enclaves. That will be a decision that they will have to make, and it's very hard to 
dictate that from a distance."). See also U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, 
Address at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe Plenary Session (Nov. 30, 
1993) ("We call upon all warring parties to stop their unconscionable conduct that blocks the 
delivery of critically needed supplies through [Tuzla airport]. We also call upon the warring 
parties to live up to their recently signed agreements to permit secure land access for relief 
convoys. The warring parties must see that this is in their best interests. Full access will 
serve the vital needs of all Bosnia's factions."). Even President Clinton found himself 
adopting the notions of warring factions and civil war in an exchange with reporters, where 
he declared: "But there will not be-the killing is a function of a political fight between three 
factions. Until they agree to quit doing it, it's going to continue. And I don't think that the 
international community has the capacity to stop people within the nation from their civil 
war until they decide to do it." Exchange with Reporters (Jan. 24, 1994), in l PUBLIC PAPERS 
OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: WILLIAM J. CLINTON 121, 122 (1995). 
19 See Geyer, supra note 11, at 91. 
20 According to David Rohde: 
A key element in Janvier's thinking was an apparent belief that he could do 
business with the Bosnian Serbs. Janvier may have turned down the crucial 
request for Close Air Support on the night before the town fell because he 
sincerely believed General Tolirnir's promise the Serb attack had stopped. 
Janvier was quick to believe Serb propaganda and Mladic's complaints about 
Muslim provocations, according to aides. Janvier argued in the June 9 meeting in 
Split that the Serbs would no longer defy the UN if they were treated with 
respect. 
DAVID RHODE, ENDGAME: THE BETRAYAL AND FALL OF SREBRENICA, EUROPE'S WORST 
MASSACRE SINCE WORLD WAR II 367 (1997). 
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result of many unscrupulous and manipulative leaders seeking their own 
power and wealth at the expense of ordinary people in their countries."21 
The antithesis of fairness is artificial impartiality and moral 
equivalence. An example of moral equivalence created through falsehoods 
occurred when, immediately after the Sarajevo market was struck by an 
artillery shell in 1995 killing 68 Bosnians, General Michael Rose threatened 
that, unless the Bosnian government signed up to yet another cease-fire, the 
general would disclose to the media the Bosnian government had killed its 
own people in an attempt to gain international sympathy. General Rose's 
threat was made with full knowledge that a UN investigation had 
determined the shell had in fact been fired by Serbian forces, and that the 
U.S. embassy in Belgrade had reported that the conspiracy theory of 
Bosnian government responsibility had in fact originated in Belgrade as 
part of its propaganda effort. 22 
The antithesis of rectitude is behavior intended to erode the moral 
imperative to take action. For example, Secretary Christopher sought to 
erode the moral imperative to use force or take other aggressive action, 
when he testified before the U.S. Congress in the spring of 1993 that all 
parties to the conflict were equally responsible for the atrocities, which did 
not amount to a campaign of genocide. At the time internal CIA and State 
Department reports-subsequently leaked to the New York Times-
indicated over 90 percent of the atrocities were being committed by Serbian 
forces, and the campaign very likely constituted attempted genocide?3 
The antithesis of retribution/requital is political legitimization and de 
facto or de jure immunity. Political legitimization occurs when individuals 
responsible for war crimes are embraced by the international mediators or 
others as "partners in peace," and essential to the peace process. For 
instance, David Owen repeatedly legitimized Radovan Karadzic by 
embracing him as a legitimate partner in the ICFY negotiations in Geneva, 
despite Karadzic's clear culpability at the time for attempted genocide. 
Similarly, Richard Holbrooke's now famous quote just before the 
negotiation of the Dayton Accords, "[y]ou can't make peace without 
President Milosevic,"24 reestablished Milosevic as a legitimate partner in 
peace despite his orchestration of genocide against non-Serbs. De facto 
immunity is best represented by NATO's initial reluctance to apprehend 
indicted war criminals at large in Bosnia and what may be perceived as 
21 WESLEY K. CLARK, WAGING MODERN WAR: BOSNIA, KOSOVO, AND THE FUTURE OF 
CO!I.1BAT 68 (2001). 
22 Telegram from American Embassy in Belgrade to Department of State (Feb. 16, 1994) 
(Doc. No. 94BELGRA01232). 
23 See MICHAEL P. SCHARF, BALKAN JUSTICE: THE STORY BEHIND THE FIRST 
INTERNATIONAL WAR CR1MES TRIAL SINCE NURE!1.1BERG 31 (1997). 
24 Jurek Martin, US Fears Wider War in Balkans if Bosnia Talks Fail, FIN. TIMES 
(London), Nov. 2, 1995, at 3. 
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Slobodan Milosevic's immunity, until the spring of 1999, from his 
international crimes. 
III. The Functions of Justice 
Within the context of creating stable, peaceful societies out of war-tom 
states, the norms and institutions of justice may serve several functions. These 
include establishing individual responsibility and denying collective guilt, 
dismantling and discrediting institutions and leaders responsible for the 
commission of atrocities, establishing an accurate historical record, providing 
victim catharsis, and promoting detenence. 
A. Establishing Individual Responsibility and Denying Collective 
Guilt 
The first fi.mction of justice is to expose the individuals responsible for 
atrocities and to avoid assigning guilt to an entire people. If foreign 
policymakers fail to grasp the notion of individual responsibility, they are likely 
to assign collective responsibility to an entire population. Not only is such an 
assignation of guilt inappropriate and unfair, but it will likely skew the policy 
options under consideration for managing the crisis. 
Importantly, by assigning guilt to specific perpetrators on all sides, the 
Tribunal was designed to avoid the assignment of collective guilt which had 
characte1ized the years following World War II and in part laid the foundation 
for the commission of atrocities during the 1990s Balkan conflict. "Far from 
being a vehicle for revenge," the first President of the Yugoslav Tribunal, 
Antonio Cassese, explains, by individualizing guilt in hate-mongering leaders 
and by disabusing people of the myth that adversary ethnic groups bear 
collective responsibility for the crimes, "[the Yugoslav Tribunal] is a tool for 
promoting reconciliation. "25 
The assignment of individual guilt to government leaders would also 
serve the purpose of providing the justification for any use of force to 
prevent the continued commission of atrocities. As noted by Michael 
Walzer: 
[t]he assignment of responsibility is the critical test of the 
argument for justice. . . . If there are recognizable war crimes, 
there must be recognizable criminals. . . . [T]he theory of 
justice should point us to the men and women from whom we 
25 Report of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for 
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territ01y of the 
Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., at 12, U.N. Doc. A/49/342 (1994). 
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can rightly demand an accounting, and it should shape and 
control the judgments we make of the excuses they offer (or 
that are offered on their behalf) .... There can be no justice in 
war if there are not, ultimately, responsible men and women.26 
171 
While this function requires prosecution of responsible leaders, where 
the norms and institutions do not attach individual liability to a significant 
number of the individuals responsible for the commission of war crimes, 
they run the risk that they will be unable to perform the function of denying 
collective guilt, as many victims and observers will still believe that large 
or important sections of the group associated with the atrocities are still at 
large and will thus tend to blame the entire group rather than risk 
inadvertent impunity. Moreover, those persons who escape individual 
responsibility will feel emboldened by their impunity and are more likely to 
commit future crimes or interfere with the peace-building process in other 
ways. This risk is particularly acute in the former Yugoslavia where the 
Office of the Prosecutor has indicted only approximately 100 individuals of 
the over 7,000 it estimates are indictable. 
B. Dismantling Institutions and Discrediting Leaders Responsible 
for Atrocities 
The second function of justice is to provide a foundation for 
dismantling institutions and discrediting leaders and their ideology that 
have promoted war crimes. When a government pursues policies of ethnic 
cleansing or systematically denies human rights, it is often done through 
legal structures. South Africa's apartheid government used its constitution 
to oppress, and special government forces to torture and murder, members 
of black opposition groups. The South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission was later given the task of documenting the full extent of 
government involvement in racial killings and incidents of torture to help 
remove the stigma of past wrongs from new governmental institutions. In 
Yugoslavia, too, government leaders and government forces were a driving 
force behind much of the ethnic killing. 
Through the work of various justice-based institutions, in particular the 
Tribunal, it becomes possible to promote the dismantling of the institutions 
and a discrediting of the leaders who encouraged, enabled, and carried out the 
commission of humanitarian crimes. Drawing on his experience as the head 
of South Africa's Goldstone Commission (a predecessor to the South 
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission), Justice Goldstone observes 
that "exposure of the nature and extent of human rights violations 
26 
MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH HISTORICAL 
ILLUSTRATIONS 287-88 (1977). 
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frequently will reveal a systematic and institutional pattern of gross human 
rights violations. It will assist in the identification and dismantlin¥ of 
institutions responsible [for these crimes] and deter future recurrences." 7 
In the case of Serbia, there is particular benefit to laying bare to Serbs 
unscathed in Belgrade the consequences of nationalistic rhetoric. 28 Even for 
those who continue to support Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic and 
former Serb President Slobodan Milosevic, "it will be much more difficult to 
dismiss live testimony given under oath than simple newspaper reports," the 
Tribunal's deputy prosecutor, Graham Blewitt points out. "The testimony will 
send a reminder in a very dramatic way that these crimes were horrendous,"29 
and presumably aid in the continued democratic transformation of Serbia. A 
notable effect to date of the norm of justice has been to discredit the concept 
that it is permissible to commit atrocities in the effort to create a greater Serbia. 
For instance, the Serbian Orthodox Patriarch Pavle, speaking in Kosovo in 
June 1999, declared, "'If the only way to create a greater Serbia is by crime 
. . . then I do not accept that, and let that Serbia disappear. And also if a 
lesser Serbia can only survive by crime, let it also disappear. And if all the 
Serbs had to die and only I remained and I could live only by crime, then I 
would not accept that, it would be better to die. "'30 
By failing to make sufficient information available about the 
individuals, institutions, and ideologies associated with the commission of 
atrocities, there is a significant risk that these individuals, institutions, and 
ideas may in fact attain some degree of de facto legitimization. For 
instance, the Office of the Prosecutor's prolonged failure to publicly indict 
the leaders of the Serbian political and military regime responsible for the 
atrocities in Bosnia and the failure of the United States to consistently 
identify certain political leaders as suspected war criminals-and in fact 
publicly rehabilitating them-served the purpose of legitimizing the 
Serbian regime, which then committed nearly identical atrocities in 
Kosovo. Moreover, the failure of the United States and its allies to provide 
the Tribunal with the resources and evidence to indict Slobodan Milosevic 
prior to the Dayton negotiations enabled him not only to substantially 
influence the institutional structure of post-war Bosnia in a manner which 
furthered his objectives but also legitimized him as a partner in peace. 
The need for the mechanisms of justice to de-legitimize the 
perpetrators of international crimes is all the more crucial given the 
27 Goldstone, supra note 4, at 490. 
28 See PETER MORGAN, A BARREL OF STONES: IN SEARCH OF SERBIA 51-53 (1997) 
(offering an important discussion of how the citizens of Serbia have managed to 
psychologically shield themselves from the atrocities committed in their name). 
29 Interview with Graham Blewitt, Deputy Prosecutor, International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia, in The Hague, Netherlands (July 25, 1996). 
3
° Carlotta Gall, Serb Orthodox Leaders Denounce Milosevic's Policies as Criminal, N.Y. 
TI!viES, June 29, 1999, at A9. 
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propensity of international peace negotiators to either avoid assigning 
responsibility for such crimes or to actually praise the behavior and 
personal characteristics of war criminals. A telling example is a previously 
classified State Department demarche to Radovan Karadzic in April 1994 
concerning the commission of war crimes in Banja Luka and the UN safe 
area of Gorazde, which declares, "those responsible for committing these 
crimes should be apprehended and punished. We expect you to do so."31 As 
noted in the Tribunal's indictment of Karadzic for genocide, he was in fact 
the individual known to be responsible for orchestrating these crimes. More 
damaging to the peace process and the operation of the nonn of justice may 
be frequent accolades, such as David Owen's description of Radovan 
Karadzic (later indicted for genocide) as a "gracious host," with "excellent 
English." Other examples of this include Warren Christopher's 
characterization of Slobodan Milosevic (later indicted for crimes against 
humanity and genocide) as "[t]hough unscrupulous and suspected of war 
crimes, Milosevic has a rough charm, and he appealed to some Western 
European leaders as a bulwark against an Islamic tide."32 Richard Holbrook 
similarly characterized Milosevic as willing to walk the extra mile for peace 
in Dayton. One of the more vivid journalistic accounts, according to Carol 
Hodge, was a Milosevic-friendly BBC program aired during the Kosovo air 
campaign titled "In the Mind of Milosevic," which portrayed him as a man 
who "'talks, laughs, is a good singer, and likes a drink occasionally and 
who, unlike President Clinton, doesn't cheat on his wife. "'33 Finally, a 
senior British army officer characterized General Mladic (indicted for 
genocide) in the following terms, "he has presence, and when he had power 
he wielded it ruthlessly. That brought him some grudging respect, if not 
admiration. "34 
31 Telegram from Secretary of State to American Embassy in Vienna (Apr. 1994). 
32 
WARREN CHRISTOPHER, IN THE STREAM OF HISTORY: SHAPING FOREIGN POLICY FOR A 
NEW ERA 352 (1998). 
33 
HODGE, supra note 15, at 32. 
34 Unnamed British UNPROFOR officer, Reuters, Nov. 10, 1996. But see CLARK, supra 
note 21, at 58 (noting that "[Mladic] carried a reputation among the U.N. forces for cunning 
and forcefulness, I found him coarse and boastful. He knew far less than he thought about 
NATO, airpower, and the capabilities of the United States."). 
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C. Establishing an Accurate Historical Record 
The third function served by justice is to establish an accurate 
accounting of the actions of all parties and to create an accurate historical 
record. If, to paraphrase George Santayana, a society is condemned to repeat 
its mistakes if it does learn the lessons of the past, then a reliable record of 
those mistakes must be established if we wish to prevent their recurrence. 
Michael Ignatieff recognizes that the "great virtue of legal proceedings is that 
[their] evidentiary rules confer legitimacy on otherwise contestable facts. In 
this sense, war crimes trials make it more difficult for societies to take refuge 
in denial; the trials do assist the process of uncovering the truth. "35 The chief 
prosecutor at Nuremberg, Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson, underscored 
the logic of this proposition when he reported to President Truman that one of 
the most important legacies of the Nuremberg trials following World War ll 
was that they documented the Nazi atrocities "with such authenticity and in 
such detail that there can be no responsible denial of these crimes in the future 
and no tradition of martyrdom of the Nazi leaders can arise among informed 
people."36 
In both Guatemala and El Salvador, truth commissions were 
established to resolve disputes between the former combatants as to who 
was responsible for which atrocities. In each case an objective historical 
record led to the establishment of credible judicial systems that then helped 
to sustain peace.37 The problems of accurately assessing blame for war 
crimes in the fanner Yugoslavia is especially acute. In Richard Goldstone's 
words, "It doesn't take hours after human rights violations for the denials to 
begin. . . . Justice plays a vital role in stopping that fabrication, in stopping 
that cover-up, which is inevitable."38 
The need for an accurate accounting of the conflict is all the more 
compelling in the case of the former Yugoslavia as according to Natasha 
Kandic, head of the Humanitarian Law Fund in Belgrade, "when I tried to 
talk about what I had seen and experienced [concerning atrocities in 
Kosovo], people would get impatient and change the subject. It's as if 
people here simply don't want to know the truth about what happened in 
35 Michael Ignatieff, Articles of Faith, INDEX ON CENSORSHIP, Sept.-Oct. 1996, reprinted 
in The Elusive Goal of War Trials, HARPER'S MAG., Mar. 1997, at 15, 16. 
36 Report to the President from Justice Robert H. Jackson, Chief of Counsel for the United 
States in the Prosecution of Axis War Criminals, Oct. 7, 1946, quoted in 49 AM. J. INT'L L. 
44, 49 (1955). 
37 See Neil J. Kritz, The Rule of Law in the Postconflict Phase: Building a Stable Peace, 
in MANAGING GLOBAL CHAOS: SOURCES OF AND RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 
587, 598-99 (Chester A. Crocker et al. eds., 1996). 
38 Justice Richard J. Goldstone, Healing Wounded People, Speech at the United States 
Holocaust Memorial Museum (Jan. 27, 1997). 
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Kosovo. Even the intellectuals are under the influence of official 
propaganda. "39 
If the institution of the Yugoslav Tribunal operates as designed, the 
Tribunal should generate a comprehensive record of the nature and extent of 
crimes against humanity and genocide in the Balkans, how they were planned 
and executed, the fate of individual victims, who gave the orders and who 
carried them out. By carefully proving these facts one witness at a time in the 
face of vigilant cross-examination by distinguished defense counsel, the 
intemational trials would produce a definitive account that can pierce the 
distortions generated by official propaganda, endure the test of time, and resist 
the forces of revisionism. 
Failure to create a comprehensive record will undermine many, if not 
all, of the benefits associated with creating an accurate record. This risk is 
heightened when only one institution of justice is employed, or where 
others are minimized. For instance, although the Yugoslav Tribunal is 
capable of creating a lengthy record for cases on its docket, there is no 
official process for summarizing findings, and no process for including 
facts not relevant to the specific cases before the Tribunal. In addition, 
where a defendant is not present before the Tribunal the indictment and 
Rule 61 hearing provide only a minimal basis for assessing the truth of the 
alleged actions. In other cases, the death of defendants prior to judgment led 
to a dismissal of their case, thereby erasing the official history of atrocities. 
D. Victim Catharsis 
The fourth function of justice is to acknowledge the vtctlms of 
crimes-an often overlooked but equally important element to the success 
of any peace process as is punishing the offenders. Offering victims an 
oppmiunity to state their injuries publicly can "provide victims with a sense 
of justice and catharsis-a sense that their grievances have been addressed 
and can more easily be put to rest, rather than smoldering in anticipation of 
the next round of conflict. "40 
In South Africa, the Truth Commission heard tearful testimony from 
thousands of victims as well as the confessions of many who played a role 
in brutal killings for the apartheid regime. Although some of this testimony 
was offered in exchange for amnesty, the overall effect was to purge the 
national consciousness of past racial killings so that the society may be 
rebuilt. In Yugoslavia the same logic was used in the International Criminal 
Tribunal's creation. According to the Yugoslav Tribunal's first president, 
Antonio Cassese, the pursuit of justice "is essential to the restoration of 
39 Michael Dobbs, Serbs Shun Discussion of Atrocities, WASH. PosT, June 24, 1999, at 
Al. 
40 Ambassador David Scheffer, Address at Dartmouth University (Oct. 1998). 
176 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. [Vol. 35:161 
peaceful and normal relations especially for people who have had to live 
under a reign of terror [because] [i]t breaks the cycle of violence, hatred, 
and extra judicial retribution. "41 
As Richard Goldstone noted, "the Nuremberg Trials played an important 
role in enabling the victims of the Holocaust to obtain official 
acknowledgment of what befell them. "42 Such acknowledgment constitutes a 
partial remedy for their suffering and a powerful catharsis that can discourage 
acts of retaliation. According to Antonio Cassese, the "only civilized alternative 
to this desire for revenge is to render justice" for otherwise "feelings of hatred 
and resentment seethin§ below the surface will, sooner or later, erupt and lead 
to renewed violence.' 3 As confirmed by Munira Subasic, who lost her 
husband and one son in the Srebrenica massacre, "if we are deprived of the 
right to justice, then we shall seek the right to revenge. "44 -
If the norm of justice is employed, but not effectively, it can have the 
disadvantage of raising the expectations of victims, and then causing them 
additional psychological trauma as they come to perceive themselves as 
abandoned, or worse, used by the international community to clear its own 
conscience. As Justice Goldstone noted in response to the persistent failure 
of the international community to arrest indicted war criminals Radovan 
Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, "[i]magine [the victims'] disappointment at the 
failure of the international community to follow through with the arrest of 
those indicted. If this situation is not corrected, the establishment of the 
Yugoslav Tribunal will have caused more harm than good to the persons it 
was intended to benefit. "45 
E. Deterrence 
Finally, in the case of criminal prosecutions, the execution of justice 
ideally acts as a deterrent against future humanitarian crimes, or at least sets 
a precedent for accountability. As observed by David Scheffer, the U.S. 
ambassador at large for war crimes issues, "[ w ]e know from experience in 
Bosnia that local authorities--camp commanders and temporary local 
41 Yugoslav Tribunal, Joint Statement By the President and the Prosecutor, U.N. Doc. 
CC/PI0/027-E (Nov. 24, 1995). 
42 Richard J. Goldstone, Fifty Years After Nuremberg: A New International Criminal 
Tribunal for Human Rights Criminals, in CONTEMPORARY GENOCIDES: CAUSES, CASES, 
CONSEQUENCES 215, 215-16 (Albert J. Jongman ed., 1996). 
43 First Annual Report of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons 
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the 
TerritOIJ' of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Agenda Item 152, 
~ 15, U.N. Docs. A/49/342, S/1994/1007 (1994). 
44 Survivors Condemn 'Lenient' Verdict (BBC television broadcast, Aug. 2, 2001 ). 
45 Goldstone, supra note 4, at 499. 
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'officials'-sometimes do what they can to improve the circumstances of 
those under their care once they know that the international community will 
investigate and punish those who fail to respect human rights standards.'o46 
Richard Goldstone adds that the existence of the Tribunal may have deterred 
widespread human rights violations during the Croatian army offensive against 
Serb rebels in August 1995. "Fear of prosecution in The Hague," he said, 
"prompted Croat authorities to issue orders to their soldiers to protect Serb 
civilian rights when Croatia took control of the Krajina and Western Slavonia 
regions of the country.'o47 
Unfortunately, as the Tribunal was not at the time perceived to be a 
meaningfbl threat, these "orders" were generally ignored with the consequence 
that the Serbian population was subject to numerous atrocities. Goldstone also 
argued that by broadcasting televised highlights of the trials throughout Bosnia 
and Serbia, that message could get through directly to the citizenry, "people 
don't relate to statistics, to generalizations. People can only relate and feel 
when they hear somebody that they can identify with telling what happened to 
them. That's why th~.4public broadcasts of the Tribunal's cases can have a 
strong deterrent effect 
Moreover, the international prosecution of responsible individuals can 
become "an instrument through which respect for the rule of law is instilled 
into the popular consciousness."49 As Judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, who 
presided over the Tribunal's first trial, succinctly ~ut it, "[w]e are here to tell 
people that the rule of law has to be respected."5 The establishment of the 
rule of law is particularly important since a dominant characteristic of the 
post-Cold War era in international affairs is that conflicts occur among 
peoples of different ethnic and religious backgrounds within states, not 
between them. In war-tom societies, one of the most basic obstacles to 
reconciliation is a lack of trust on the part of citizens between each other 
and with their government. And one of the most effective ways to 
institutionalize that trust is to establish a stable legal system and the rule of 
law.51 
46 David J. Scheffer, International Judicial intervention, FOREIGN PoL 'Y, Spring 1996, at 
34, 39. 
·
47 War Crimes Prosecutor Says Tribunal May Have Deterred Violations, DEUTSCHE 
PRESSE-AGENTUR, Jan. 26, 1996, LEXIS, News Library, DPA File. 
48 Interview with Richard Goldstone, Justice of the Constitutional Court of South Africa, 
in Brussels, Belgium (July 20, 1996). 
49 See Payam Akhavan, Justice in the Hague, Peace in the Fonner Yugoslavia? A 
Commentary on the United Nations War Crimes Tribunal, 20 HUM. RTS. Q. 737, 749 (1998). 
50 William W. Horne, The Real Trial of the Century, AM. LAW., Sept. 1995, at 5. 
51 By rule of law, one generally assumes the presence of an independent judiciary that is 
transparent, predictable, and impartial to the parties involved. The rule of law also relies 
upon a legitimate, representative government to enforce the judiciary's decisions. This 
should be distinguished from rule by law, through which authoritarian governments often 
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Although the punishment of crimes committed in the Balkans would 
send the message, both to potential aggressors and vulnerable minorities, that 
the international community will not allow atrocities to be committed with 
impunity, if a Tribunal is established and is unable to indict those responsible 
for orchestrating the campaign of terror-as the case with the inability to 
timely indict Mr. Milosevic for war crimes in Bosnia, then it may in fact 
encourage them to feel free to commit atrocities in a future conflict-as in 
Kosovo, believing they possess some degree of de facto immunity. 
In many cases, however, the nature of injustice and internal pressures 
militate toward the establishment of a truth commission often accompanied 
by grants of amnesty to bring the dark practices of civil violence into the 
light without necessarily prosecuting the guilty.52 Versions of this system 
has been ~dopted in South Africa, El Salvador, Chile, and Argentina, where 
the calculation was made that the benefits of healing wounds through the 
establishment of the truth outweighed the benefits of retributive justice.53 
But the particular circumstance of the crimes committed in the fanner 
Yugoslavia required the formation of an ad hoc criminal tribunal for both 
moral and practical reasons. First, the genocide, rape, and torture that 
occurred were of a nature and scale so horrific that nothin~ short of full 
accountability for those responsible would provide justice. 4 Second, the 
domestic legal systems in some of the republics of the former Yugoslavia 
had been so thoroughly corrupted that they were not competent to conduct a 
fair trial of the war's perpetrators, many ofwhom are still in power. 
use the legal system to legitimate their oppression. See Neil J. Kritz, The Rule of Law in the 
Postconjlict Phase: Building a Stable Peace, reprinted in TURBULENT PEACE: THE 
CHALLENGES OF MANAGING INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 801-02 (Chester A. Crocker et a!. 
eels., 2001). 
52 In the cases of Chile and Argentina, for example, "the prospect of trials for the gross 
violations of human rights perpetrated under the old regime provoked bald threats of military 
intervention." Kritz, supra note 37, at 595. 
53 The South African Truth Commission is the most successful example of this type of 
justice. Established with a two-year mandate, the Commission has strict criteria for whether 
or not applicants qualify for indemnity in return for their testimony. There has to have been a 
political motive for the applicant to have committed human rights violations and there must 
be some degree of proportionality between that motive and the offenses committed. At the 
time of this writing over 4,500 applications for indemnity had been received by the 
commission. See Goldstone, supra note 4. 
54 For a detailed accounting of "Serbian rape warfare" constructed from interviews with 
victims of mass rape, see SEADA VRANIC, BREAKING THE WALL OF SILENCE: THE VOICES OF 
RAPED BOSNIA (1996); MASS RAPE: THE WAR AGAINST WOMEN IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA 
(Alexandra Stiglmayer ed., 1994); MARIA VON WELSER, AMENDE WUNSCHST DU DIR NUR 
NOCH DEN TOD: DIE MASSENVERGEWALTIGUNGEN 1M KRIEG AUF DEM BALKAN (1993); and 
BEVERLY ALLEN, RAPE WARFARE: THE HIDDEN GENOCIDE IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA AND 
CROATIA (1996). 
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Given that the norm of justice is based upon near universally accepted 
principles and serves a variety of policy relevant functions ranging from 
deterrence to victim catharsis, one might expect that it would play a central 
if not determinative role in the peace-building process. The norm of justice 
must, however, compete for influence with other highly relevant and 
practicable approaches such as accommodation, economic inducement, and 
the use of force, which are based on equally compelling principles, and 
which have a longer history of use by peace builders. 
IV Accountability versus Accommodation 
A. Defining the Approach of Accommodation 
The approach of accommodation seeks to reduce conflict by 
accommodating the interests of adversarial states or parties. In most 
instances, the approach of accommodation instructs a negotiator to seek to 
end the conflict by meeting as many of the objectives of each party as 
possible, thereby accommodating their interests and satiating their appetite 
for more conflict. If applied appropriately, the norm can lead to the creation 
of win-win gaming situations where each party is able to attain its 
objectives without unduly prejudicing the interests of the other party. Such 
an outcome is most probable in a prisoners' dilemma and related situations, 
and least possible in deadlock situations. To achieve political support for 
accommodation, peace builders often employ the tools of anti-justice. If 
applied recklessly or forced on a deadlock situation, such as the situation in 
the fonner Yugoslavia, the norm of accommodation can ratifY illegitimate 
actions of a party and enhance its appetite for similar gains through further 
conflict. 
Institutions and individuals most frequently associated with the 
approach of accommodation tend to be those most closely associated with 
peace negotiations and thus include special envoys such as Y asushi Akashi 
and Richard Holbrooke; and UN/EU peace conference co-chairs Lord 
Carrington, Cyrus Vance, David Owen, Carl Bildt, and Thorvald 
Stoltenberg. Accommodation is frequently the approach of choice because 
it is the approach around which it is the easiest to build political will, and it 
is the approach most likely to lead to a formal agreement among the parties. 
The brokering of the Washington Agreement between Croatia and 
Bosnia represents an example of the appropriate utilization of the 
accommodation norm in that it was used to craft a relationship between 
Bosnia and Croatia which sought to meet the needs, as far as possible, of 
both parties while creating a system of democratic government capable of 
preserving those interests. Unfortunately the system has in practice proven 
difficult to implement, and may have represented too much of an 
accommodation of minority interests. 
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One of the more committed applications of the accommodation norm 
was the proposed Vance/Owen Peace Plan which intended to bring peace 
by essentially partitioning Bosnia into ethnically based cantons and 
permitting the Serbian cantons to de facto confederate with Serbia proper. 
The proposal thus sought to achieve peace at the expense of ratifying the 
aims of the campaign of ethnic cleansing and legitimizing the anti-
multicultural nationalism propagated by the Serbian and Croatian 
combatants. In fact, earlier David Owen had proposed that as EU mediator 
he actively engage the parties in redrawing their territorial boundaries. 
When this was rejected by eleven of the EU states he believed "[t]he refusal 
to make these borders negotiable greatly hampered the EC's attempt at 
crisis management in July and August 1991 and subsequently put all 
peacemaking from September 1991 onwards within a straitjacket that 
greatly inhibited compromises between the parties in dispute."55 
As it was, the Vance/Owen Peace Plan was widely perceived as the 
catalyst for the conflict between Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian 
government as the Bosnian Croats sought to capture land "promised" them 
under the peace plan.56 Similarly, with the aim of peace, the peace 
negotiators embarked on an approach until 1995 of continually redrafting 
peace plans to offer more and more favorable terms to the Serbian pa~ 
when it rejected earlier "take it or leave it" offers by the Contact Group. 7 
Some critics have even argued UNPROFOR commander General Janvier 
deliberately denied close air support to the UN Dutch defenders of 
Srebrenica in order to make a negotiated settlement more feasible. 58 Other 
55 DAVID OWEN, BALKAN ODYSSEY 33 (1995). 
56 See YVES HELLER, DES BRASIERS MAL ETEINTS: UN REPORTER DANS LES GUERRES 
YOUGOSLAVES 1991-95 (1997). For a firsthand account by a British officer of the conflict 
resulting from the Vance/Owen Peace Plan, see BOB STEWART, BROKEN LNES: A PERSONAL 
VIEW OF THE BOSNIAN CONFLICT (1994 ). 
57 See 1.7 BALKAN WATCH: ACTION COUNCIL FOR PEACE IN THE BALKANS (Washington, 
D.C.), Oct. 24, 1994, available at http://www.pub1icintemationallaw.org/programslbalkans/ 
archives/1994/BW17.DOC. 
58 According to David Rhode, "The series of statements and proposals made by Janvier 
before, during and after Srebrenica's fall indicate he may have intentionally allowed the safe 
area to fall." RHODE, supra note 20, at 364. Rhode acknowledges though that: 
Taking the extraordinary step of deciding to sacrifice a UN safe area on his 
own without the permission of his superiors does not fit into Janvier's 
character, according to supporters and detractors. 'This was a man who 
should've been selling roasted chestnuts on the streets of Paris,' said one 
former UNPROFOR official. 'Not making these kinds of decisions.' 
RHODE, supra note 20, at 368. Rhode also noted: 
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commentators note air strikes were also blocked by the French government 
as it had promised General Mladic it would seek to prevent air strikes in 
exchange for the release of two French pilots and several hundred 
UNPROFOR peacekeepers held hostage by Bosnian Serb forces in the 
spring of 1995.59 
The perspective of those supporting unfettered accommodation when 
faced with the criticism that the approach of accommodation might reward 
the use of force and ethnic cleansing, is typified by Canadian general Lewis 
MacKenzie, the former head of the UN forces in Bosnia when he testified 
before the U.S. Congress that "[n]ow, obviously the critics will say this 
rewards force and sets a bad example. I can only say to them, read your 
history. Force has been rewarded since the first caveman picked up a club, 
occupied his neighbor's cave and ran off with his wife."60 
Unfortunately, the over reliance on the approach of accommodation 
can create situations where once diplomacy alone fails, policymakers are 
reluctant to move on to or incorporate other norms, creating even more 
intractable conflicts. As noted by former British defense minister Sir John 
Nott in 1994, "[w]e will not bring about a diplomatic solution. Even if there 
is peace obtained, it cannot hold. We have given these diplomats, these 
committees . . . two and a half years to bring about peace, and they have 
failed .... I would remove the arms embargo [on the Bosnian Government] 
straight away because it is only a military balance now in that part of the 
world that can restore stability."61 Similarly, Ed Vulliamy, the 
correspondent for the Guardian during the Bosnian conflict, argued that an 
early use of force against Serb military targets designed to neutralize their 
artillery and destroy their communications system would have brought 
them to the negotiating table, and then "the Serbs would have been required 
Suspicions about what U.S. intelligence knew about the attack on Srebrenica 
and subsequent executions have been high. The CIA, the theory goes, knew of 
the pending attack and knew the town would fall. The United States then 
stood by as Srebrenica fell and an enclave that didn't fit into Anthony Lake's 
endgame strategy was eliminated. Aerial photos of suspected mass graves, 
according to the theory, were suppressed until after the executions were well 
over to avoid embarrassment and the United States being called on to stop the 
killing. 
Id. at 368-69. 
59 Chuck Sudetic, The Reluctant Gendarme: Why Is France Protecting Indicted War 
Criminals in the Sector of Bosnia It Controls?, THE ATLANTIC MoNTHLY, Apr. 2000, at 91, 
97. 
60 Hearing of the House Armed Services Committee: U.S. Policy Toward Bosnia, FED. 
NEWS SERVICE, May 26, 1993, LEXIS, FEDNEW File (statement of Major General Lewis 
MacKenzie). 
61 Sir John Nott, Reuters, Nov. 26, 1994, reprinted in 1.12 BALKAN WATCH: ACTION 
COUNCIL FOR PEACE IN THE BALKANS (Washington, D.C.), Nov. 28, 1994, available at 
http://www.publicinternationallaw.org/programs/balkans/archives/1994/BW112.DOC. 
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to dismount the sieges and to accept international supervision in a complete 
reversal of ethnic cleansing. This would have been infinitely easier in 1992 
than the in1position of the Dayton plan-with its pledge to return all 
refugees-is now."62 This assessment was supported by Manfred Woerner, 
the then NATO Secretary-General.63 
In the end, the prinlary risk associated with the approach of 
accommodation is that it can become one of appeasement, and possibly 
even coercive appeasement.64 While accommodation may be a useful and 
valuable tool, appeasement is characterized by an artificial moral 
equivalence, neutrality in the face of aggression, active efforts to erode the 
moral imperative to become involved, and the total exclusion of the use of 
force and the norm of justice, with the effect of often encouraging further 
violence and atrocities. 
The approach of coercive appeasement is more nuanced and entails 
appeasement within the context of the perceived use of force and the 
perceived incorporation of the norm of justice. Coercive appeasement is 
characterized first by a general diplomatic deficit which entails the failure 
to create the conditions for effective leadership or the articulation of a clear 
policy objective coupled with the inability to structure a coordinated or 
capable diplomatic process for peace-building. This diplomatic deficit is 
augmented by a failure to adequately undergo institutional and personal 
"learning" during the peace-building process. Often the diplomatic deficit 
encompasses the unintentional misuse of diplomatic signaling, and the 
readily transparent articulation of intentions by the peace-builders. Coercive 
appeasement is also characterized by aggressive accommodation, which 
entails the pursuit of actions designed to meet the needs and interests of the 
aggressor, coupled with intentional or unintentional obfuscation of the 
aggressor's true objectives. 
Moral duplicity is also an element of coercive appeasement, consisting 
of the application of pressure on the victims designed to compel their 
acquiescence to the primary demands of the aggressor, coupled with 
intentional and unintentional actions designed to create division among the 
political representatives of the victim state. Moral duplicity also frequently 
entails declarations and actions designed to create the perception of moral 
equivalence among the parties, thereby eroding the distinction between 
aggressor and victim and spreading culpability among all parties. 
62 Vulliamy, supra note 3, at 81. 
63 Geyer, supra note 11, at 82-83. 
64 Serb leaders "engaged in high-level negotiations with representatives of the 
international community while their forces on the ground, executed and buried 
thousands of men and boys within a matter of days . ... At various points during the 
war, these negotiations amounted to appeasement. " Report of the Secretary-
General Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/35: The Fall of Srebrenica, 
UN GAOR, 54th Sess., Agenda Item 42, ~~ 468, 500, UN Doc. A/541549 (1999). 
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Frequently these official pronouncements are designed to actively erode the 
moral and strategic imperative to adopt approaches other than that of 
accommodation. Finally, coercive appeasement may be characterized by 
constrained use of force, which entails activities designed to constrain and 
minimize the use of legitimate force, and marginalized justice, which 
entails actions designed to minimize and obfuscate the role of justice, 
including the political resurrection of culpable partners in peace. 
B. Forcing a False Choice Between Justice and Accommodation 
Traditionally, many foreign policy practitioners and scholars have 
perceived of justice and peace in conflicting terms. The choices are often 
cast in terms of either working toward peace and ignoring justice or seeking 
justice at the price of jeopardizing any chance for peace.65 Proponents of 
peace are typically characterized as "more aware, more worldly," while 
those in favor of justice are characterized as "living in an unreal world, 
shall we say, a metaphysical or idealistic realm."66 
While this distinction is overly artificial, histmically, amnesty or de 
facto immunity from prosecution has often been the price for peace. The 
Turks, who many considered responsible for the genocidal massacre of over 
one million Annenians during World War I, were given amnesty in the 1923 
Treaty ofLausanne;67 the French and Algerians responsible for the slaughter of 
thousands of civilians during the Algerian war were given amnesty in the Evian 
Agreement of 1962; and Bangladesh gave amnesty in 1973 to Pakistanis 
charged with genocide in exchange for political recognition by Pakistan.68 
65 Keith Doubt, "We Had to Jump Over the Moral Bridge": Bosnia and the Pathetic 
Hegemony of Face-work, in THE CONCEIT OF INNOCENCE: LOSING THE CONSCIENCE OF TI-lE 
WESTIN THE WAR AGAINST BOSNIA 121 (Stjepan G. Mestrovic ed., 1997). 
66 Id. 
67 See Vahakn N. Dadrian, The Historical and Legal Interconnections between the 
Armenian Genocide and the Jewish Holocaust: From Impunity to Retributive Justice, 23 
YALE J. INT'L L. 503, 510-11 (1998). Initially, the Allied Powers sought the prosecution of 
those responsible for the massacres. The Treaty of Sevres, which was signed on August 10, 
1920, would have required the Turkish government to hand over those responsible to the 
Allied Powers for trial. See Treaty of Peace Between the Allied Powers and Turkey (Treaty 
of Sevres), Aug. 10, 1920, art. 142, reprinted in 15 AM. J. INT'L L. 179, 209 (Supp. 1921). 
The Treaty of Sevres, however, was not ratified and did not come into force. It was replaced 
by the Treaty of Lausanne, which not only did not contain provisions respecting the 
punishment of war crimes, but also was accompanied by a "Declaration of Amnesty" of all 
offenses committed between 1914 and 1922. See Treaty with Turkey and Other Instruments 
Signed at Lausanne (Treaty of Lausanne), July 24, 1923, reprinted in 18 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 
37, 50-52, 92-95 (Supp. 1924). 
68 SeeM. CI-!ERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
LAW 228-30 (1992). During the war of Bangladesh's independence, West Pakistan troops 
killed approximately one million East Pakistanis who supported efforts to establish the 
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During the 1980s, to facilitate a transition to democracy, the governments 
of Argentina, Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Uruguay each granted 
amnesty to members of the former regime who commanded death squads that 
tortured and killed thousands of civilians within their respective countries.69 To 
this list must be added the modem practice of the United Nations, which in the 
early 1990s worked to block inclusion of provisions in the Cambodia peace 
accords providing for the prosecution of former Khmer Rouge leaders for their 
atrocities, pushed the Mandela government to accept an amnesty for crimes 
committed by the apartheid regime in South Africa, and helped negotiate, and 
later endorsed, a broad amnesty for the leaders of the Haitian military regime in 
order to induce them to relinquish power.70 
Even the Nuremberg experience eventually involved the bartering away 
of accountability as the cost for German support of the Western alliance 
during the beginning of the Cold War. Within ten years of the conclusion of 
the Nuremberg Trials, all 150 of the convicted Gennan war criminals 
(including several who were serving life sentences and a few who were 
sentenced to death) were released from Landsberg prison pursuant to a 
controversial clemency program.71 While this program removed a "diplomatic 
pebble from the State Department's shoes," it had the effect of undermining the 
purpose of the Nuremberg Trials. In a nation-wide survey conducted by the 
U.S. State Department, West Germans overwhelmingly indicated their belief 
that the reason for American leniency was that "[t]hey realize the injustice of 
the trials." 72 
As explained by an anonymous UN official, the quest for justice and 
retribution is traditionally believed to hamper the search for peace, which in 
tum prolongs the conflict, enables the continuation of atrocities, and 
increases human suffering. The UN official also asserts that the intrusion of 
fact-finding missions seeking to investigate crimes committed by one side 
independent nation of Bangladesh. India and Bangladesh initially agreed to bring charges of 
genocide and crimes against humanity against 195 of the 10,000 Pakistani troops who had 
been captured by India. Meanwhile, Pakistan filed a case before the International Court of 
Justice to compel India to repatriate the Pakistani troops. Ultimately, political considerations 
prevailed and in 1973 Bangladesh and India agreed not to prosecute the Pakistani prisoners 
in exchange for political recognition of Bangladesh by Pakistan and the withdrawal of 
Pakistan's case against India before the International Court of Justice. See id. 
69 See Naomi Roht-Arriaza, State Responsibility to Investigate and Prosecute Grave 
Human Rights Violations in International Law, CAL. L. REv. 449, 458-61, 484 (1990). 
70 See Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Conclusion: Combating Impunity, in IMPUNITY AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 299-300 (Naomi Roht-Arriaza ed., 1995). 
71 See PETER H. MAGUIRE, LAW AND WAR: AN AMERICAN STORY 217, 221, 223 (2000). 
The Nuremberg Trials include the trial of the major Nazis before the International Military 
Tribunal and the twelve subsequent trials at Nuremberg (August 1946-Aprill949). 
72 !d. at 229. 
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may complicate the task of peace negotiations to the point where they 
become prolonged or impossible.73 
Efforts to build peace in the former Yugoslavia were not exempt from 
the conflict between justice and accommodation.74 According to Payam 
Akhavan of the Office of the Prosecutor of the Tribunal, "from its very 
inception in 1993, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia was surrounded by the so-called 'peace versus accountability' 
controversy." According to Akhavan, "It was argued indicting political and 
military leaders such as Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic would 
undermine the prospects of a peace settlement because they were 
indispensable to ongoing negotiations, and because they would have no 
incentive to put an end to the fighting without assurances of immunity or 
amnesty."75 In fact, during his tenure as co-chairman of the Yugoslav Peace 
Conference, David Owen expressly opposed the prosecution of Serbian 
officials engaged in the peace negotiations on the basis that this would 
undermine his efforts to craft a settlement. 76 
Even after the massacre in Srebrenica and the clear pattern of 
genocide, policymakers doubted the compatibility of justice and 
accommodation. As noted by Richard Goldstone, "[p ]articularly at the time 
of the negotiations at Dayton, Ohio, in September, 1995, there were many 
astute politicians and political commentators who suggested that, in fact, 
peace and justice were in opposition, and that the work of the Yugoslav 
Tribunal was retarding the peace process in the Balkans."77 Some 
commentators even noted that with Radovan Karadzic's alleged approval 
rating among Bosnian Serbs of 79%, any NATO efforts to capture him 
would undermine the implementation of the Dayton Peace Accord and 
foster the Serbian people's belief that they were subject to perpetual 
injustice and persecution.78 Goldstone rightly expressed surprise at this 
view, especially in light of the atrocities which had been committed over 
four years. 79 
73 Anonymous, supra note 2, at 256. 
74 See Jean E. Manas, The Impossible Trade-off: "Peace" versus "Justice" in Settling 
Yugoslavia's Wars, in THE WORLD AND YUGOSLA V1A'S WARS 42-43 (Richard H. Ullman ed., 
1996). 
75 Akhavan, supra note 49, at 738. 
76 See Laurie A. Cohen, Application of the Realist and Liberal Perspectives to the 
Implementation of War Crimes Trials: Case Studies of Nuremberg and Bosnia, 2 UCLA J. 
lNT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 113, 154 (1997-1998) (citing Mirko Klarin, The Moral Case for a 
War Crimes Tribunal, WALL ST. J.EUR., Mar. 17, 1994, at 8. According to Mirko Klarin, 
77 Goldstone, supra note 4, at 488. 
78 See Charles G. Boyd, Making Bosnia Work, FOREIGN AFF., Jan.-Feb. 1998, at 42, 50-
51. 
79 See Goldstone, supra note 4, at 488. See also Floyd Abrams & Diane F. Orentlicher, In 
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In some cases, the existence of a mechanism of justice, such as a 
tribunal, may be used to further the efforts of those pursuing an approach of 
accommodation by indicating that the norm of justice plays a role outside 
the peace process and that questions of culpability belong solely with that 
mechanism. For instance, in February 1994, when Secretary of State 
Warren Christopher was under pressure by the media to identify those 
responsible for the commission of war crimes in Bosnia, which would have 
limited his ability to accommodate the interests of those individuals, his 
standard press guidance was: "I would like to emphasize that no conclusion 
can or should be drawn at this stage as to the culpability of particular 
individuals. This is a question that should be reserved for the War Crimes 
Tribunal or other court, where the question of culpability will be considered 
on a case-by-case basis."80 
Still others, like Richard Holbrooke, asserted that in order to achieve 
the aims of justice, it was necessary to negotiate with and if necessary 
accommodate/appease those who were responsible for the commission of 
atrocities. 81 As such, the insistence on a role for justice was characterized as 
something which undermined the effectiveness of the negotiator. When 
asked by Senator Smith during his confinnation hearing why he had 
systematically declined to ever indicate Milosevic's guilt for the war and 
atrocities in the former Yugoslavia, Holbrooke responded, "This is tough 
slogging, and my job was not to make moral judgments. I leave that to 
moralists and political pundits and columnists, most of whom think they're 
moralists anyway .... I was well aware of the fact that I might have to 
continue to be engaged on other issues. And the highest goal here was to 
avoid war, bring peace."82 
Many peace-builders also assert that the conflict between 
accommodation and justice reflects the perspectives of those on the ground 
trying to save lives versus those more distant from the conflict. For 
instance, during his confirmation testimony, Ambassador Holbrooke 
responded to criticisms of his persistent failure to acknowledge Milosevic' s 
culpability as made "by people who haven't been there, who haven't tried 
to end wars and prevent wars. "83 Similar statements were made by 
numerous generals serving in UNPROFOR, who also invoked the mantra of 
"saving lives" over pursuing justice.84 In fact, as reported by Cambridge 
80 Department of State, Final Genocide q/a, Press Guidance, drafted Oct. 25, 1993 
(released Dec. 13, 1998). 
81 See RICHARD HOLBROOKE, To END A WAR 367 (1997). 
82 Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: Nomination of Richard Holbrooke 
as U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, FED. NEWS SERVICE, June 24, 1999, LEXIS, 
FEDNEW File (statement of Richard Holbrooke). 
83 !d. 
84 BRENDAN SIMMS, UNFINEST HoUR: BRITAIN AND THE BOSNIAN WAR 173-222 (2001) 
(discussing the approach of"saving lives" and the "man on the ground" argument). 
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historian Brendan Simms, many of the actual troops on the ground in the 
safe areas, and particularly SAS troops, were keenly aware of the failings of 
accommodation and urged for a stronger use of force in the pursuit of 
. . 85 JUstice. 
The "saving lives" rational, while encapsulated in only two words, is a 
powerful tool used by the negotiators to undermine the influence of the 
nonn of justice. By characterizing accommodation/appeasement of war 
criminals in the cloak of "saving lives," it automatically infers that those 
interested in justice are not interested in saving lives, or at least are willing 
to pennit more killing in order to accomplish an idealistic objective. This 
view is succinctly stated by an anonymous UN official who criticized the 
then Yugoslav Tribunal prosecutor and president at the time for their public 
pressure on the Dayton negotiators. The UN official argues that their "ill-
considered statements" could have led to a breakdown of delicate 
negotiations in Dayton.86 "Everyone who was at the Dayton proximity talks 
knew that if this issue [mandatory cooperation with the Tribunal] were 
pressed it could have ruined the talks."87 He declared that they were acting 
"irresponsibly" and asked, "in the name of what moral principle would one 
be able to defend those [further] deaths?"88 As evidenced by the subsequent 
conflict in Kosovo, it was in fact the act of accommodation at Dayton that 
resulted in further deaths, and that only the use of force, coupled with the 
indictment of Milosevic, brought an end to ethnic cleansing perpetrated by 
Serbian forces. 
Some scholarly commentators assert that the tension between justice 
and accommodation is inherent in that "[t]he need to establish power 
sharing structures that accommodate rival factions and interests may well 
clash with the desire to punish perpetrators of human rights abuses" and 
"the need to reform the police and the military may be at odds with the 
practical need to bring those powerful groups into the peace process."89 In 
their eyes, the inherent tension "prompt[ s] the question of which model 
works best in a given situation, the power-sharing conflict manager's 
model, or the democratizer's political justice model? Empirical evidence 
suggests that a concern for justice must be tempered by the realities of 
negotiation and by the parties' interests in reaching a political settlement."90 
85 ld. 
86 Anonymous, supra note 2, at 257. 
87 Jd. at 256. 
88 I d. at 257. 
89 Hampson, supra note 9, at 712. 
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Zartman ed., 1995)). See also DONAW L. HOROWITZ, ETHNlC GROUPS IN CONFLICT (1985); 
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(1996); David A. Lake & Donald Rothchild, Containing Fear: The Origins and 
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In response, defenders of the justice norm have argued, "[i]n short, 
there is a grudging but emerging widespread acceptance-even among the 
so-called realists-that regional peace and stability, democratization, and 
multiethnic coexistence in Bosnia-Herzegovina are at best precarious 
without the arrest and prosecution of indicted persons," and that "[t]he 
[Yugoslav Tribunal] demonstrates that far from being irreconcilable, peace 
and accountability, realities and ideals, are inextricably interlinked."91 
According to Richard Goldstone, "if one is talking about short term cease-
fires, short term cessation of hostilities, it could be that the investigation of 
war crimes is a nuisance. But if one is concerned with real peace, enduring 
and effective peace, if one is talking about proper reconciliation, then, in 
my respectful opinion, there is and can be no contradiction between peace 
and justice. "92 
Despite the tradition of an apparent overwhelming preference for 
accommodation over justice, there is no clear evidence that this approach 
promotes lasting peace.93 In fact, the opposite may be the case. For example, 
history records that the international amnesty given to the Turkish officials 
responsible for the massacre of the Armenians during World War I 
encouraged Adolf Hitler some twenty years later to conclude that Germany 
could pursue his genocidal policies with impunity.94 In 1939, in relation to the 
acts of genocide and aggression committed by German forces, Hitler remarked, 
"Who after all is today speaking about the destruction of the Annenians?"95 As 
David Matas, a Canadian expert on international law, observed, "Nothing 
emboldens a criminal so much as the knowledge he can get away with a crime. 
That was the message the failure to prosecute for the Armenian massacre gave 
to the Nazis. We ignore the lesson of the Holocaust at our peril."96 
Richard Goldstone declared that in the case of the fmmer Yugoslavia the 
failure of the international community to prosecute Pol Pot (Cambodia), Idi 
Amin (Uganda), Saddam Hussein (Iraq), and Mohammed Aidid (Somalia), 
among others, encouraged the Serbs to launch their policy of ethnic cleansing 
with the expectation that they would not be held accountable for their 
HOW EMERGING DEMOCRACIES RECKON WITH FORMER REGIMES (Neil J. Kritz ed., 1995); cf 
Timothy D. Mak, The Case Against an International War Crimes Tribunal for Former 
Yugoslavia, 2 INT'LPEACEKEEPING 536 (1995). 
91 Akhavan, supra note 49, at 739-40. 
92 Richard Goldstone, The United Nations' War Crimes Tribunals: An Assessment, 12 
CONN. J. INT'L L. 227, 233-34 (1997). 
93 For a review of the failings of amnesties, see ARYEH NEIER, WAR CRIMES: BRUTALITY, 
GENOCIDE, TERROR, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE (1998). 
94 See Dadrian, supra note 67, at 532, 534, 538, 542. 
95 Adolf Hitler, Speech to Chief Commanders and Commanding Generals (Aug. 22, 
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international crimes.97 When the international community encourages or 
endorses an amnesty for human rights abuses, it sends a signal to other rogue 
regimes that they have nothing to lose by instituting repressive measures; if 
things start going badly, they can always bargain away their crimes by agreeing 
to peace. The apprehension of Slobodan Milosevic in the spring of 2001 and 
his trial before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
may be the first step in the reversal of this long history of accommodation and 
de facto immunity. 
Given the poor track record for accommodation, there has been 
increasing demand for an inclusion of the norm of justice in peace-building 
since the end of the Cold War.98 For example, since 1989, some level of 
justice, in the fonn of international tribunals and truth commissions, has 
been pursued in Argentina, Cambodia, Chile, East Timor, El Salvador, 
Ethiopia, Guatemala, Honduras, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and South Africa, 
as well as the former Yugoslavia. 
V. Conclusion 
This article has illustrated how the approach of justice/accountability 
can aid the peace-building process by denying collective guilt through the 
establishment of individual responsibility, enabling the dismantling of 
institutions responsible for perpetuating the commission of atrocities, 
establishing an accurate historic record, providing a cathartic process for 
victims, and deterring atrocities in similar conflicts elsewhere. 
While human rights and peace advocates have come to treat the nonns 
and institutions of justice as a panacea for conflict and atrocities, 
professional diplomats generally continue to dismiss justice as at best mere 
moral window dressing and at worst an impediment to peace-which can 
best be pursued through the approaches of accommodation and/or ·use of 
force. Reared in the school of realism, peace-builders are often perplexed 
by the mantra of human rights advocates claiming there can be no peace 
without justice, when in fact history appears to be replete with many 
instances of peace based on injustice, as well as situations where pursuing 
justice has thwarted the quest of peace. 
The case study of the Former Yugoslavia examined in this article 
demonstrates that the truth lies somewhere in between. Although plagued 
by disorganization, a lack of coherency, the pursuit of short term interests, 
and the frequent willingness to settle for public relations successes and 
97 Michael Scharf, The Case for a Penn anent International Truth Commission, DUKE J. 
COMP. &INT'LL. 375,398 & n.!28 (1997). 
98 For more on the increased demand for and ability to provide justice to those who have 
become victims of international war crimes, see Scheffer, supra note 46, at 34-51. 
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political victories rather than meaningful action, the injection of the norm of 
justice and approach of accountability into the Yugoslav peace-building 
process did have some measure of success. This is reflected in the creation 
of the first ever United Nations War Crimes Tribunal, the requirements to 
cooperate with the Tribunal builtinto the Dayton and Paris Peace Accords, 
the fall from power and eventual prosecution of officials responsible for 
international crimes, and the deployment of multi-national force to stop 
ethnic aggression and international peacekeepers to promote the protection 
of human rights in the area. 
The effectiveness of the justice-based institutions developed for the 
Yugoslav crisis, however, was seriously undermined by an outdated 
perception held by the peace builders of the relationship between justice 
and peace-building, the lack of experience of peace-builders in creating and 
operating institutions of justice, and the lack of an understanding of the 
important role of justice by some of the key individuals tasked with 
operating the institutions of justice. The effect of this can be seen in the 
watering down of the justice provisions in the Dayton and Paris Accords, 
the failure to give a mandate to the military forces to apprehend indicted 
war criminals, the Tribunal's unnecessary delay in indicting Slobodan 
Milosevic, and the refusal of the Security Council to impose sanctions on 
Serbia for its many instances of non-cooperation with the Tribunal. 
Consequently, to date, few of the functions of justice have been fully 
realized in the former Yugoslavia. As a result of the mixed record of the 
approach of accountability in the Yugoslav crisis, many foreign policy 
practitioners and international relations scholars continue to view the role of 
justice in peace-building with significant skepticism. 
But to tum away from the justice/accountability approach for this 
reason, would be to take the wrong lesson from the Yugoslav experience. 
Rather, the lesson of peace-building in the former Yugoslavia is that if 
applied and implemented adeptly, justice is compatible with peace, and in 
fact may be critical to attaining a meaningful and durable peace. 
